

A Mongol Moment in Islamic Jurisprudence: Did Ibn Taymiyya Excommunicate Errant Muslim Rulers for Failing to Implement Sharia?

Many Islamic fundamentalists today retrace their ‘law of war’ back to a medieval jurist called Ibn Taymiyya. One of the most controversial elements in the mufti’s legacy was when he issued the so-called Mardin fatwa against the Mongol leaders of the Ilkhanate. Ibn Taymiyya declares these leaders kafir (act of takfir) for not implementing Sharia law in the Ilkhanate despite their conversion to Sunni Islam. The question of this paper is whether this fatwa means that Ibn Taymiyya advocated for rebellion against wayward Muslim leaders or not. This paper does what only a few works on Ibn Taymiyya ventured so far: not only to shed light on the historical context in which the legal instrument of the Mardin fatwa was issued but also to concurrently elaborate on Ibn Taymiyya’s stance on Muslim authority. Thus, the research establishes that taking into account his other works as well, it is clear that the mufti did not wish to initiate an internal jihad against Muslim leaders, as he did not even regard the Ilkhans as Muslims. Therefore, what he did is to call for the basic form of military jihad against unbelievers. While vast research concentrates on the mufti’s longstanding influence on fundamentalists, our present comparative analysis also examines how the Mardin fatwa has been invoked by modern Islamists and jihadists to justify violent actions against their national leaders, based on a particular interpretation of Sharia derived from a medieval jurist whose formulation was sufficiently ambiguous to arguably permit such usage. Ideally, this contributes to the library worth of research regarding the mufti inasmuch as it sheds new light on the real impact Ibn Taymiyya has had on the development of Islamic law of war (Fiqh al-Jihad).

Keywords: *Islamic legal theory, law of war, jihad, takfir, excommunication, Ibn Taymiyya, Sharia, Islamic state, fundamentalism*

1. Introduction

1.1. A jurist for all ages

Since the fall of the last Islamic Caliphate, the emergence of Muslim-majority states gave ground to the resurgence of the internal debate within Islamic societies whether the leaders of these states should implement Islamic law. The role of *Sharia* is the pivotal issue in this paper. Many scholars

* ORCID ID: 0009-0008-7717-7388.

teaching in this regard on the thoughts and acts of a medieval scholar. Thus, one name seems to have become central in this debate: that of *Ibn Taymiyya*.¹

Taqi ad-Din Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328) was born in troubled times, in the city of Harran, only 5 years after the destruction of Baghdad by Mongol forces in 1258. His childhood was marred by fleeing from new Mongol invasions.² Their conquest over Syria loomed over Islamic lands: it seems that in the middle of the 13th century the survival of the Islamic civilization was at stake. The initial radical breakthrough during the battle of Ayn Jalut in 1260 by the Mamluks shed the first light of hope for the Muslim world. In this context, the young scholar begins his work in Damascus, joining the most traditional *Sunni madhhab*, the *Hanbali* school. Soon he came under heavy criticism from his peers due to his radical teachings and actions. One of his disciples called him tactless and arrogant, while the explorer *Ibn Battuta* wrote in his journal that the scholar “*had a screw loose*.”³ Nevertheless, the crowds seem to have loved him, and this appreciation resurfaced even in modern times: “*Today, few figures from the medieval Islamic period can claim such a hold on modern Islamic discourses*”⁴ as *Ibn Taymiyya*.

The complex legacy of *Ibn Taymiyya* has been greatly dealt with, while efforts to untangle his person and personal motives have only been carried out fairly recently. There is no doubt that this unorthodox figure in his controversial struggle for Islamic orthodoxy became one of the most influential legal thinkers in Sunni Islam ever since the *Wahhabis* ‘resurrected him’ from the fog of history in the 18th century. Despite the fact that he was very much persecuted by the political elite and marginalized by the religious elite, he had many followers in his life who venerated him to an extent that was to his dislike.

There are several teachings to this formidable scholar of Islamic *fiqh* (jurisprudence) that made him important in Islamic legal thinking, but arguably one of his most significant (and controversial) adjudications was the so-called the *Mardin fatwa* issued, wherein the jurist proclaimed the Mongol Ilkhan an infidel (act of *takfir*) and thus a subject for *jihad*, even though the Ilkhan had converted to Islam by that time. This legal act is the subject of the present paper which will analyze the nature of this legal document and whether it contributes to internal *jihad* against wayward Muslims (most importantly rulers designated as apostates).

Modern *Islamist* thought is built from several elements, and it is interesting to see how scholarly literature creates links between *Ibn Taymiyya* and later formative fundamentalist figures (ranging from *Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab* through *Al-Afghani*, *Muhammad Abdub*, *Rashid Rida* to *Abul A’la Maududi* and *Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj* or the factions behind al-Qaeda and Daesh/ISIL). We however have to limit ourselves, and only some of the most conspicuous references shall be addressed in a paper of this scope. The issue of the *fatwa*, the question of *takfir* and the teaching on *jihad* are closely linked, but their analysis shines light on the different aspects of Islamic struggle for both inner stability and external expansion over unbelievers. This paper ventures elaborates mostly on the issue of *takfir*, leaving ground for further research when it comes to its correlation with Islamic *jihad*.

1 See e.g.: MAHER, Salafi-Jihadism – The history of an idea 58, 84–86, 93–95; GERGES, ISIS – A history 37–38, 83; SIMON, Az iszlám fundamentalizmus 14–17; ALMOND, Strong Religion – The Rise of Fundamentalisms around the World 57; ZAMAN, Modern Islamic Thought in a Radical Age 265, 315; SHEIKH, Making Sense Of Salafism 177–196.

2 MICHOT, *Ibn Taymiyya* 290.

3 RAPOPORT, *Ibn Taymiyya and His Times* 4.

4 RAPOPORT, *Ibn Taymiyya and His Times* 4.

1.2. The literature on Ibn Taymiyya

Owing to his significant presence in *Islamist* literature, many have analysed *Ibn Taymiyya's* legacy. The first comprehensive works on the medieval scholar were written by the French Orientalist *Henri Laoust*⁵ but none of these early publications serve as an all-encompassing insight into his motives and complex personality according to *Róbert Simon*.⁶ In his Islamic history, *R. Stephen Humphreys* from the U.S. also misses a depiction of *Ibn Taymiyya* in early scholarship as “an activist Sunni scholar within the framework of an autocratic-military state.”⁷

The already mentioned Hungarian Orientalist, *Simon* presents fundamentalist movements from the Kharijites to the Muslim Brotherhood and *Ibn Taymiyya* in his view is the most important *neo-Hanbali* thinker who expressed many ideas in a scientific manner that later served as a questionable basis for less scientific visions of ‘global Islamism’.⁸

Simon regards the Muslim scholar one of the (if not the) most important medieval forerunner of modern fundamentalist movements. Due to *Ibn Taymiyya's* radical public protests and persecution, he became a role model especially to *Sayyid Qutb* and *Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj* who saw him as the ideal embodiment of both theory and practice.⁹ Generally *Simon* detects three basic teachings of *Ibn Taymiyya* that have been invoked by Islamists: 1) the dichotomic worldview of *Dar al-Islam* and *Dar al-Harb*; 2) excommunication or *takfir*; 3) resistance to a ruler who does not keep *Sharia*. However, he acknowledges that all three have been contested as a legitimate reference by modern scholarship.¹⁰ We shall delve deeper in this ambiguity in the latter part of this literature review.

Emmanuel Sivan, a historian from the Hebrew University wrote extensively on Islamic radicalism. In *Strong Religion* (which he co-authored), it was asserted that “When modern Sunni radicals looked in the 1950s for a tradition to build upon, they naturally turned to *Ibn Taymiyya*.”¹¹ In other of his works, *Sivan* called the mufti as one of the “master theoreticians of the jihad in the late Middle Ages”,¹² which I will generally agree with when I expound his theology on the subject. He also adds, that a ‘modern twist’ was attached to *Ibn Taymiyya*, and a ‘revolutionary version’ of him was created in modern times.¹³ I will have to agree with his sharp avowal: “A firebrand he surely was, but hardly a revolutionary,”¹⁴ but it will need further substantiation than *Sivan* provided.

Muhammad Qasim Zaman from Princeton University also wrote about how *Rashid Rida*, *Yusuf al-Qaradawi* and other fundamentalists borrowed ideas from the medieval mufti.¹⁵ According to *Zaman*, “Radical Islamists have appealed to him in justifying rebellion against a putatively Muslim ruler.”¹⁶

5 See inter alia: LAOUST, *Le Traité de droit public d’Ibn Taimiyya; La profession de foi d’Ibn Taymiyya*.

6 SIMON, *Az iszlám fundamentalizmus* 115.

7 HUMPHREYS, *Islamic History* 193.

8 SIMON, *Az iszlám fundamentalizmus* 14–17.

9 SIMON, *Az iszlám fundamentalizmus* 120.

10 SIMON, *Az iszlám fundamentalizmus* 124.

11 ALMOND, *Strong Religion – The Rise of Fundamentalisms around the World* 57.

12 SIVAN, *Radical Islam* IX.

13 SIVAN, *Radical Islam* 94.

14 SIVAN, *Radical Islam* 95.

15 ZAMAN, *Modern Islamic Thought in a Radical Age* 262.

16 ZAMAN, *Modern Islamic Thought in a Radical Age* 315.

Naveed S. Sheikh from Keele University declared *Ibn Taymiyya* to be a *proto-Salafist* in his chapter on *Salafism* in *The Routledge Handbook on Religion, Politics and Ideology*,¹⁷ or someone who represented *creedal Salafism*. *Sheikh* refers to *Ibn Taymiyya*'s criticism of other creeds of Islam, especially that of the *Asharis*, but especially highlights his anti-Mongol fatwas against syncretic Mongol leaders who only partially accepted Islam (but rejected the *Sharia*), as these would later "set a precedent for the anathematization (*takfir*) of Muslim leaders who did not rule in conformity with *Shariatic injunctions*."¹⁸ He described how *Salafist* thinkers *Rashid Rida*, *Sayyid Qutb* and *Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj* relied heavily upon the medieval jurist. I will argue however, that contrary to *Sheikh*'s view, the practice of *takfir* against the Mongol rulers is less about inner rebellion against Muslim leaders and more about the *jihad* against foreign elements.

In a more critical fashion, *Daniel Benjamin* and *Steven Simon* called modern fundamentalists the "children of *Ibn Taymiyya*".¹⁹ *Fawaz A. Gerges* affirms that the thoughts of the 14th century theologian contributed to the worldview of ISIS and affiliates, and did not counter the bond between *Ibn Taymiyya* (calling him "radical Islamic scholar") and radical *jihadist* revolutionaries.²⁰

Shiraz Maher from King's College London accepts that *Ibn Taymiyya* did not precisely define who is exempted as a target from *jihad*, leaving enough room to basically target anybody who is perceived a threat.²¹ He, however, submits that the question of *takfir* and the anti-Mongol fatwa is far from the simplistic reading of modern *Jihadists*,²² and this probably falls closest to our argumentation in this paper.

In contrast, an opposing perspective by certain scholars maintains that invoking *Ibn Taymiyya* is largely unjustified. For instance, *Yahya M. Michot* basically denies all modern references by Islamists on *Ibn Taymiyya* as misinterpretations in his entry in the *Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought*. In the end, I believe *Michot* questions too much, submitting that the mufti's *Sharia*-based policies have little in common with today's political Islam.

Another critical voice is of *Johannes 'Hans' Jansen*,²³ but his analysis of the anti-Mongol *fatwas* made me reach a somewhat more heedful conclusion due to the context in which they were produced and the insistence of the mufti against deposing the ruler.

The recent publication²⁴ of *Jaan S. Islam* and *Adem Eryiğit* provide an analysis of the texts written by *Ibn Taymiyya*; the coauthors also acknowledge the 'continuation' of *Ibn Taymiyya*'s thought in modern *Salafism*, but venture to shed new light on the original thinker. The Muslim authors provide much needed political context which is something we shall also carry out in a limited manner, reaching a somewhat different outcome than the authors.

Though a recent book edited by *Yossef Rapoport* deals mostly with *Ibn Taymiyya*'s life and age, the collected essays therein come to the apologetic conclusion that the mufti's writings were used arbitrarily and out of context by the likes of *Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Faraj*, but rather

17 SHEIKH, Making Sense Of Salafism 177–196.

18 SHEIKH, Making Sense Of Salafism 180.

19 BENJAMIN – SIMON, The Age of Sacred Terror, chapter 2, iBook edition.

20 GERGES, ISIS – A history 37–38.

21 MAHER, Salafi-Jihadism 58.

22 MAHER, Salafi-Jihadism 84–86.

23 JANSEN, The dual nature of Islamic fundamentalism 32–33.

24 ISLAM – ERYIĞIT, Islam and the State in Ibn Taymiyya.

well understood by *al-Qaradawi*.²⁵ We partially relied on this reasoning when it comes to the fatwas against the Mongol invaders, but further critical analysis should be attached in another research on their findings regarding the *jihad* teaching of the jurist.

1.3. Methodology

First and foremost, the paper at hand presents a textual analysis on the *Mardin fatwa* and other relevant works of *Ibn Taymiyya*. Then it puts forward the comparative analysis of *Ibn Taymiyya's takfir* doctrine with the interpretations of some prominent modern Islamic theorists who had a predilection to refer to *Ibn Taymiyya* in one way or another, namely the more moderate *Abdullah Bin Bayyah* as well as Islamists: *Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraji* and *Yusuf al-Qaradawi*. This analysis, combined with a synthesis of the historical context and related works of *Ibn Taymiyya*, seeks to offer a novel contribution to the broader scholarly examination of the mufti.

This medieval mufti's legacy is vast, but due to our focus here, we shall ignore important elements of his work, such as his criticism of the *Ashari* theology and *kalam* (speculative theology). We shall have no capacity here to touch upon his various confrontations with certain Sufi practices, nor to elaborate on all aspects of his extended struggle against *bidah* (innovation or reform that substantiates heresy such as the relativism of the *Mutazilites*), nor his teaching on the caliphate or the continuation of the *ijtihad* (individual legal reasoning by a scholar based on his interpretation of the *Quran* and the *Sunna*) or divorce (a teaching that is now incorporated into the laws of most modern Muslim nation-states²⁶). The Shia evaluation of *Ibn Taymiyya*, as well as the juror's criticism vis-à-vis Shiism are both omitted from this paper.

In this analysis of legal history, I relied on the compilation by *Jaan S. Islam* and *Adem Eryiğit* for the translated text of the *Mardin fatwa*.²⁷

Finally, it must be emphasized that the issue of the anti-Mongol *fatwas* and the question of *takfir* are closely connected to the doctrine of *jihad*, and their analysis illuminates the various dimensions of Islamic struggle, both in terms of internal consolidation and external confrontation with non-believers. Owing to the limited scope of this paper, only the question of *takfir* examined in depth; consequently, the jurisprudential dimensions of *jihad* remain underdeveloped. This limitation underscores the need for further research on this much-debated subject, a task I intend to pursue in subsequent research. This upcoming work will provide a parallel interpretation of these doctrines that affect our present day reality and a comparative analysis with modern *Salafist* theorist and propagators of *Sharia*-based societies. Thus, the completed project aspires to contribute to a more rigorous assessment of the authentic legacy and scholarly impact of this medieval jurist, while also fostering a deeper understanding of his modern self-proclaimed adherents.

2. The analysis of the Mardin fatwa

2.1. The takfir against Mongol leaders

After the brutal shock of the Mongol invasions and the surprisingly successful challenge that the Mamluks posed on them, *Ibn Taymiyya* became an ardent supporter of the Mamluk Sultan. First the victory at Ayn Jalut, then *Ghazan Khan's* defeat at Shaqhab and the fall of Crusader Acre

25 RAPOPORT, *Ibn Taymiyya and His Times* 17.

26 RAPOPORT, *Ibn Taymiyya and His Times* 17.

27 ISLAM – ERYİĞİT, *Islam and the State in Ibn Taymiyya*.

convinced the mufti that the Mamluks were the ‘champions of Islam,’ despite all the internal strifes in the military dynasty.²⁸

During his lifetime, the mufti (an Islamic jurist who is entitled to issue *fatwas* – non-binding legal opinions – regarding Islamic law) produced material that would serve as theological justification in the fight against Mongols who were completely defeated by the turn of the century. He issued his most famous *fatwa* against the Ilkhanate in 1303. *Ibn Taymiyya* lobbied the Sultan to completely clear the region from Mongol presence.²⁹

It is worthwhile to examine the texts that reflect on *Ibn Taymiyya*’s theology regarding the struggle against Mongols. What makes this issue so peculiar and complex is that *Ghazan Khan*, head of the Ilkhanate (Mongol realm in the Empire’s southwestern territory, incorporating all Persian lands as well as Azeri and Turkish territories) converted to Sunni Islam after their defeat, therefore many came to the conclusion that the mufti gave permission to rebellion (*baghy* in Arabic) against Muslim leaders when they are not following *Sharia*. *Ghazan Khan* made Islam the state religion over the Ilkhanate, and his successor, *Öljaitü* experimented with Christianity, Buddhism, Sunni and finally Shia Islam as well.³⁰ While the Ilkhanids’ deviation from the ‘right path’ was indeed a basis for *Ibn Taymiyya*’s strong condemnation against them, I intend to show that the teaching of the *takfir* against them reflects more his thought on external *jihad* rather than a teaching of internal revolt.

The problem for *Ibn Taymiyya* is best summarized by *Bernard Lewis*: “*Shari’a law was not merely neglected or tacitly disregarded; it was, in certain important areas, repealed and replaced by other systems of law, of non-Islamic and therefore, by Muslim definition, nondivine origin.*”³¹ Their adherence to their own *Yassa* legal system and other pagan (*kufri*) traits made them subject for *takfir* by *Ibn Taymiyya*. *Takfir* is to declare someone *kafir*, which is basically excommunication in Muslim terms.

The 1303 *Mardin fatwa* blames the Mongols of having pillaged Muslim lands and committed countless atrocities, nonetheless, after this devastation the Mongol leadership has the audacity to proclaim the *shahada* (testimony of the Islamic faith).³² *Ibn Taymiyya* puts forward (based on *Book and Tradition* that is the *Quran* and the *Sunna* which are the primary sources for Islamic law) that these people and the likes of them should be fought: “*Fighting them is an obligation until they adhere to its laws even if they outwardly state the two testimonies of faith and adhere to some of its laws.*”³³

He explains that the enemy’s adherence to certain Islamic regulations does not constitute a reason to stop fighting them if they are still in breach of *Sharia*.³⁴ In a rather harsh manner, the jurist exacts *takfir* on many transgressors: “*Any faction that withholds some of the obligatory prayers, fasting, pilgrimage, adherence to the protection of blood, adherence to jihad against the disbelievers, or implementing the poll-tax upon the People of the Book (and others from the obligations of the religion and its prohibitions) – an obligation nobody has an excuse to abandon or reject – the rejecter of its obligation is declared a disbeliever.*”³⁵

28 MICHOT, *Ibn Taymiyya* 239.

29 ISLAM – ERYİĞİT, *Islam and the State in Ibn Taymiyya* 22.

30 ISLAM – ERYİĞİT, *Islam and the State in Ibn Taymiyya* 22.

31 LEWIS, *The Political Language of Islam* 87.

32 ISLAM – ERYİĞİT, *Islam and the State in Ibn Taymiyya* 153.

33 ISLAM – ERYİĞİT, *Islam and the State in Ibn Taymiyya* 153.

34 ISLAM – ERYİĞİT, *Islam and the State in Ibn Taymiyya* 154.

35 ISLAM – ERYİĞİT, *Islam and the State in Ibn Taymiyya* 154.

Salafis and *Islamists* centuries later tend to refer to these lines when they declare the leaders of their nation-states infidel, but it is no accident that some scholars note here that *Ibn Taymiyya* is not clear whether he also means to anathemize a Muslim leadership itself or not. In the next paragraph the mufti himself seems to implicitly differentiate between an external *kafir* rule (against whom it is not a sin to rebel) and the ‘imam’s rule’. He exemplifies the *Kharijites* (an Islamic sect from the first century of Islam and which is generally regarded as heretic) as *kafiruna* (unbelievers) who were rightfully massacred by *‘Ali*, while the caliph himself rightfully dealt with others (disobedient Muslims) more leniently.³⁶ The measure by which he distinguishes is whether someone “withdrew obedience from the leader with an agreeable interpretation”, while the *takfir* is relevant to those “who do not adhere to the explicit, frequently narrated laws of Allah”³⁷ that is the *Sharia*. Mongols, as *Ibn Taymiyya* notes, can be more pious and devout in certain Islamic tenets than average Muslims, however their altogether rejection of the *Sharia* is what makes them *kafir*.

Then again, this still does not really help the one who intends to interpret *Ibn Taymiyya* in the context of internal revolt. Perhaps, juxtaposing all these lines to *Ibn Taymiyya*’s other works can shed more light on the dilemma, therefore we shall do so below. Since these declarations effectively declared the Ilkhans to be in the state of *kufri*, I argue that we can no longer view this as an internal theological feud within the Muslim world. This belongs to the classic realm of *jihad* against the ‘infidels’, a point in which I agree with *Bernard Lewis*.³⁸ It seems safe to assume this point from the words of the mufti himself from his nominal work “*Al-Siyasa al-Sharia*” (“*Government of the Religious Law*”): “As to whether he is, when put to death because of this [neglect of a religious duty], an infidel, a renegade or only a half a believer is a matter of difference of opinion among the jurists, like *Ahmad [ibn Hanbal]* and others. Most of the early [as-Salaf] learned men assert that he is an infidel, provided he admits that prayer [or any other religious obligation] is a religious duty. If he declares, on the other hand, that prayer is not a religious duty, he is considered an infidel by all.”³⁹

This is strongly in contrast with a situation when the ‘*ulama* confronts their own erroneous Muslim rulers, or even incite revolt against them. But of this latter, *Ibn Taymiyya* can hardly be accused of. *MaHer* also points out that the *Mardin fatwa* was used by later *Salafis* and *Islamists* “to license popular unrest and intra-Muslim violence even during times of political stability,”⁴⁰ however I shall underline that *Ibn Taymiyya* did not necessarily mean a revolt against the ruler. On the contrary, from *Al-Siyasa al-Sharia*, his insistence on a firm political ruler seems adamant. So much so that he reuses an old maxim (generally held to be related from *Muhammad*): “Sixty years (domination) of a despotic ruler are better than a single night (passed) without a ruler,” and “One day in office of a just ruler [imam] is better than sixty years of worship.”⁴¹ The reason for this is that *Ibn Taymiyya* regards the Sultan as the ‘shadow of Allah on earth,’ and the exercise of authority as one of the greatest religious duties that brings its subjects closer to Allah.⁴²

36 ISLAM – ERYİĞİT, *Islam and the State in Ibn Taymiyya* 154.

37 ISLAM – ERYİĞİT, *Islam and the State in Ibn Taymiyya* 155.

38 LEWIS, *The Political Language of Islam* 88.

39 IBN TAYMIYYA, *Siyasah al-shariyah* 147–148.

40 MAHER, *Salafi-Jihadism* 94.

41 IBN TAYMIYYA, *Siyasah al-shariyah* 33, 188.

42 IBN TAYMIYYA, *Siyasah al-shariyah* 187–188.

2.2. The problem with political power

Ibn Taymiyya is, however, not naïve, but clearly sees that power distorts its wielder. Many rulers, he admits, feign obedience to *Allah* in order to amass more power and wealth. “*The greatest wish of a man who craves for authority is to be like Pharaoh, and a man who is greedy for the accumulated money is to be like Korah [Arabic: Qarun].*”⁴³ He criticizes those who want exaltation as it breeds tyranny. But he clarifies that it is *Allah* who punishes them for this. In other works by *Ibn Taymiyya*, we can see that he interpreted the *Sunna* and early tradition to be patient with flawed rulers: “*This is why the Prophet (...) ordered patience in the face of mistreatment of the Leaders, and prohibited fighting them as long as they establish prayer, and he said ‘give them their right, and ask for your rights from Allah.’ As a result, it is an established principle among the People of Sunna and the Community to stick to the main body, to not fight against the rulers, and to cease fighting during civil strife.*”⁴⁴

The *mufti* put forward that it is hard to find the middle way in wielding power (for the common good, *jihad* etc.) and also fulfil one’s religious duty of faith. He assumes that there are two wrong paths which are exemplified by Christians and Jews: one on which is dedicated to religion without exercising sufficient authority (Christianity) and one on which one is entangled in authority and its shenanigans (war, wealth etc.) without sufficient devotion to religion (Jews).⁴⁵ *Ibn Taymiyya* advises the Muslim ruler not to follow these faulty ways, but instead to follow those of the Prophet *Muhammad*, his Companions, and the *Rashidun* caliphs.

In the meantime, nowhere in these teachings can we find incitement against authority. Thus, the *takfir* of Mongols is an especially intriguing subject as the *mufti* was “*faithful to the Islamic legal restriction preventing in any form of rebellion against a Muslim political authority.*”⁴⁶ Even in the case of an unjust rule, the jurist advises obedience and subjugation in his *fatwa On Caliphate, Monarchy, and Fighting Rebels*: “*The Two Authentic Books report, further, from ‘Abdullāh b. ‘Umar, Allah be pleased with him, that the Prophet upon him be blessings and peace said: ‘all Muslims are obligated to listen and obey, whether he likes or dislikes [the command], unless he is ordered to commit disobedience [to God] (...) you are required to listen and obey in hardship and ease, whether you like or dislike [the command], even when you are treated unfairly.’ The meaning of his statement (...) refers to a position of unfairness, i.e., that you must obey the Leaders of Affairs even if they are not equitable or give you what you deserve.*”⁴⁷

Again, *Ibn Taymiyya*’s advice for such unfair situations is not revolution or revolt, but patience – one must expect that *Allah* will exact justice (the transgressor leader will be branded with a flag on the Day of Judgement according to the extent of his betrayal⁴⁸). What is more, the *mufti* even threatens with *takfir* should someone rebel against authority: “*One who sees something his leader does should remain patient, as, if anyone were to disobey the Sultan even by the span of a hand and died upon it, he dies a death of the days of ignorance.*”⁴⁹ This means that someone who disobeys

43 IBN TAYMIYYA, *Siyasah al-shariyah* 189.

44 *Ibn Taymiyya’s Majmū’ al-Fatāwā* quoted in ISLAM – ERYİĞİT, *Islam and the State in Ibn Taymiyya* 104.

45 IBN TAYMIYYA, *Siyasah al-shariyah* 192–193.

46 ISLAM – ERYİĞİT, *Islam and the State in Ibn Taymiyya* 23.

47 ISLAM – ERYİĞİT, *Islam and the State in Ibn Taymiyya* 140.

48 ISLAM – ERYİĞİT, *Islam and the State in Ibn Taymiyya* 141.

49 ISLAM – ERYİĞİT, *Islam and the State in Ibn Taymiyya* 141.

an imperfect, but otherwise Muslim ruler, dies a death as if he was a pagan of the *jahiliyya* (that is ‘ignorant’ and ‘barbaric’ pre-Islamic Arab society laden with polytheism).

This is the reason why for example the neo-traditionalist sheikh *Abdullah Bin Bayyah* is referred to have stated that these *fatwas* “can under no circumstances be appropriated and used as evidence for leveling the charge of *kufr* (unbelief) against fellow Muslims, rebelling against rulers, or acting treacherously towards those who live together with Muslims.”⁵⁰ (This is why he distanced himself from scholars with more radical interpretations after the turmoil of the so-called Arab Spring.⁵¹)

Therefore, there seems to be no other alternative from the analysis of *Ibn Taymiyya*’s writings that the Mongols were simply not Muslims in his eyes, their *takfir* therefore is more of a matter of factual declaration rather than a religious act of changing one’s religious status from Muslim to non-Muslim. Hence, this arguably serves no parallel to a situation when a Muslim who leaves the path of Islam is anathemized. The jurist sees the fight against Mongols as a religious obligation, which is, then none other than the obligation of *jihad*⁵² against infidels (or apostates/unbelievers) who are to be ‘fought into submission,’ just like during the *ridda* wars under *Abu Bakr*⁵³ or the Kharajites under *‘Ali*.⁵⁴

2.3. Assessment of the Mardin fatwa in Muslim circles

Muslim scholars today are still divided on how to assess this sensitive issue. To demonstrate this inner-Muslim debate, it is interesting to note that a 2010 conference held in Mardin aimed to reevaluate the *fatwa* and one of their tools for that was of transcription. The already mentioned Islamic scholar *Abdullah Bin Bayyah* avowed in the *New Mardin Declaration* that *Ibn Taymiyya*’s last sentence in the *fatwa* was mistranslated as to those who are fallen apart from *Sharia* are “to be fought (*yuqātal*)”, while in reality it is claimed he wrote “*yu’āmal* (*dealt with according to their status*)”.⁵⁵ On this basis he claimed that terrorist organizations fabricated an entire ideology based on a mistake that caused severe crisis for the *umma*. While worth mentioning, we shall not delve into this issue any further, except to note that even scholars of a more progressive leaning, like *Yahya Michot* criticized this new reading of *Ibn Taymiyya*.⁵⁶

More radical figures in Islamism used the anti-Mongol *fatwas* in order to justify their revolts against leaders within the Muslim world. *Islamists* found a suitable role-model in the person and teaching of *Ibn Taymiyya* who did not refrain from exercising violent *jihad* himself, having participated in some battles and committed public actions against the perceived enemies of Islam.⁵⁷

This problem made the issue of these *fatwas* particularly delicate. However, the assumptions of radical ideologues, e.g. that of the radical Jordanian-Palestinian cleric *Abu Qatada al-Filistini* seems dubious in light of the above when he uses the *fatwas* as a means for fighting against the

50 ISLAM – ERYIĞIT, *Islam and the State in Ibn Taymiyya* 3.

51 AL-AZAMI, ‘*Abdullāh Bin Bayyah and the Arab Revolutions* 343–361.

52 HOOVER, *Makers of the Muslim World – Ibn Taymiyya* 24–26.

53 ISLAM – ERYIĞIT, *Islam and the State in Ibn Taymiyya* 183.

54 ISLAM – ERYIĞIT, *Islam and the State in Ibn Taymiyya* 23.

55 ISLAM – ERYIĞIT, *Islam and the State in Ibn Taymiyya* 29.

56 ISLAM – ERYIĞIT, *Islam and the State in Ibn Taymiyya* 29–30.

57 MICHOT, *Ibn Taymiyya* 239.

‘withholders of *Shari‘a*’.⁵⁸ But arguably one of the most notorious references to *Ibn Taymiyya* was made by *Muhammad Abd alSalam Faraj*.

In *The Absent Obligation*, *Faraj* declares that today’s rulers have become apostates from Islam, as they were all brought up (as *Faraj* put it) at the ‘colonialist tables’ of Crusaders (Christians), Zionists and Communists. Hence, such Muslim rulers are Muslims in name only.⁵⁹ He refers to *Ibn Taymiyya* for declaring bigger punishments over apostates than infidels. *Faraj* invokes the consensus among the *madhhabs* as per to *Ibn Taymiyya* that the suitable punishment for rebels is death, even if they proclaim the *shahada*.⁶⁰

Faraj relies on him (*Sheikh-ul-Islaam* as he called the *mufti*) for detailing out the apostasy on the Mongols’ part – and uses most of the quotes in the meantime that we have already presented from the *mufti*. But I agree with *Euben* and *Zaman* that the jihadist leader was “*Eager to drape his arguments in the authority of the illustrious fourteenth-century jurist*,” thus he set up a “*dubious historical parallel*” between the Egyptian presidency and *Genghis Khan*, highlighting how the modern “*crisis is far more dangerous*.”⁶¹

However, in his lavish quotes from the jurist, *Faraj* could not procure anything from *Ibn Taymiyya* that would support his actions specifically against the leader, as *Ibn Taymiyya* dealt more carefully when it came to authority. This actually was the basis for reputation against *Faraj* by the Egyptian government in the *al-Liwa’ al-Islami* and *Minbar al-Islam* journals.⁶² But *Faraj* states that imperialism is present in Muslim lands because of wayward local rulers, therefore *jihad* shall commence with them.⁶³ Though he acknowledges that one of the main targets for *jihad* was *al-Quds*, i.e. Jerusalem (the liberation of which is a ‘legal command’ compulsory to all Muslims⁶⁴), however, he warns that it is rational to begin with enemies who are closer. Thus, he prioritized the *takfir*-based *jihad* over external *jihad*.

He made it clear that he does not regard *jihad* as defensive only, and advocated for the use of the sword to spread the Islamic faith: “*Islaam was spread by the sword, but only against the leaders of kufr, who veiled it from reaching the people, and after that no one was forced to embrace it. It is obligatory upon the Muslims to raise their swords against the rulers who are hiding the truth and manifesting falsehood, otherwise the truth will never reach the hearts of the people*.”⁶⁵

In this reasoning, however, he relies more on the *Quran-tafsir* (interpretive commentary) of *Sayyid Qutb*⁶⁶ rather than *Ibn Taymiyya* as the following line of thought is not of the *mufti* even if most of the context is: “*As for the Muslim lands, the enemy resides in their countries. In fact the enemy is controlling every thing. The enemies are these rulers who have snatched the leadership of the Muslims. Thence Jihaad against them is fardh ‘ayn [individual obligation]*.”⁶⁷ One may argue that in his exuberant zeal, *Faraj* became the rebel himself who was anathemized by *Ibn Taymiyya*:

58 ISLAM – ERYİĞİT, Islam and the State in Ibn Taymiyya 26–27.

59 FARAJ, *The Absent Obligation*, 24.

60 FARAJ, *The Absent Obligation*, 24–25.

61 EUBEN, *Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought* 323.

62 SIVAN, *Radical Islam* 103.

63 FARAJ, *The Absent Obligation* 51.

64 FARAJ, *The Absent Obligation* 50.

65 FARAJ, *The Absent Obligation* 51–52.

66 Mostly found in his book *In the Shade of the Qur‘an*, see: JANSEN, *Faraj, Muhammad ‘Abd al- Salam* 172.

67 FARAJ, *The Absent Obligation* 61.

the apostate against Islam and authority who was suitably executed for his involvement in the assassination of Egyptian president *Anwar Sadat*.

Again, I concur with scholars such as *Rapoport* and *Ahmed* who assert that “*Faraj’s work purposefully disregards the socio-historical context of Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwās and even distorts its juridical integrity.*”⁶⁸ He did not examine the depth of *Ibn Taymiyya’s* adjudication and used the Mongol conflict to invoke verse 39 of the *Surah al-Anfaal*: “*And fight them until there is no more Fitnah, and the religion will be for Allaah Alone*”⁶⁹ – a teaching that *Ibn Taymiyya* incorporated in his own argumentation, albeit not in the setting of a revolt against Muslim rulers, but of a holy war waged against infidels that the Mongols were in his eyes.

This distinction may seem insignificant, but it has severe practical concomitants when it comes to inner strife within the Muslim world. Hence, it is no wonder that even radical *Islamist* ideologue *Yusuf al-Qaradawi* taught about falling into “*the abyss of takfir*”.⁷⁰ The varied (one might say arbitrary) use of *Ibn Taymiyya’s* teaching on this subject is further reflected by the fact that *al-Qaradawi* actually “*cites Ibn Taymiyya in support of peaceful participation in the political life of an unjust, non-Islamic state.*”⁷¹ This demonstrates how antithetical conclusions can be regarding the same teaching. So he asserts based on the *mufti* that it is outright vital for devout Muslims to take up positions in wayward Muslim administrations in order to help these systems finding their way back to the *Sharia*. He even translated *mufti’s* writing in this regard as the annex of his own book, stating that: “*Sheikh Al-Islam Ibn Taymia gave a very strong opinion on the permissibility of assuming some public offices in an unjust state, if the occupant of such office would seek to alleviate some of the injustice or curb evil and corruption.*”⁷²

Deducing from the above, I agree in this regard with *Johannes Jansen* and *Yahya Michot* that *Ibn Taymiyya’s* anti-Mongol *takfir* falls under the classic category of ‘war theology’ against an external enemy. In my opinion, *Michot* rightly asserted that those who use these *fatwas* as justification to revolt against the president of Egypt or the junta of Algeria etc. are forgetting that the *fatwas* were issued against an invader, and that the *mufti* always remained faithful to the Sultan.⁷³ *Emmanuel Sivan* also propounds that the *mufti* never challenged the legitimacy of any sultans, and his indictments were never due to insurgencies, but for perceived theological deviances.⁷⁴ Furthermore, *Islamist* references to the *mufti* are erroneous also because “*to question the Islamic status of a country following laws other than the shari’a is to ignore that, for Ibn Taymiyya, the status of a country varies according to ‘the states of the hearts of its inhabitants,’ not according to the nature of its regime, and that every law contributing to more justice, whatever its origin, scriptural or not, is per se a part of the shari’a.*”⁷⁵

On the other hand, *Johannes ‘Hans’ Jansen* invokes the hagiographies on *Ibn Taymiyya* as he was inciting for *jihad* on the streets of Mamluk Cairo against ‘unbelievers’.⁷⁶ It was because of the

68 RAPOPORT, *Ibn Taymiyya and His Times* 17–18.

69 FARAJ, *The Absent Obligation* 32.

70 AL-QARADAWI, *Islamic Awakening Between Rejection and Extremism* 31.

71 RAPOPORT, *Ibn Taymiyya and His Times* 17.

72 AL-QARADAWI, *Priorities of The Islamic Movement in The Coming Phase* 19, 116–117.

73 MICHOT, *Ibn Taymiyya* 240.

74 SIVAN, *Radical Islam* 95.

75 MICHOT, *Ibn Taymiyya* 240–241.

76 JANSEN, *The dual nature of Islamic fundamentalism* 35–36.

mufti's apparent condemnation of tyrannicide that made even this Dutch revisionist Islamic scholar dubious of such strong statements that the 13th century scholar would be the 'father of modern terrorism',⁷⁷ nevertheless he called him a 'war propagandist'⁷⁸ who used such vague and abstract terms that could easily be used for modern *Islamists* for declaring their worldly leaders apostates.⁷⁹ Though the dismissal of *Ibn Taymiyya's* rhetoric as mere war propaganda is lacking insofar as it seems clear that there was complex theological and juridical framework behind all of it, nonetheless, *Jansen* indeed appears to be justified in his postulation that the abstract language used by the scholar easily welcomes broad interpretation.⁸⁰ For instance *Daniel Benjamin* and *Steven Simon* wrote that "By asserting that *jihad* against apostates is justified – by turning *jihad* inwards and reforming it into a weapon for use against Muslims as well as infidels – he planted a seed of revolutionary violence in the heart of Islamic thought."⁸¹ If indeed he had done so, it would mean that *Ibn Taymiyya* practiced '*ijtihad*', i.e. individual interpretation of the *Quran*, something which the '*ulama* rejected at the time, as it was commonly accepted that the gates for '*ijtihad* were closed by the 10th century.⁸² *Ibn Taymiyya* was indeed advocating for opening these intellectual gates, but it is not clear from this context that he intended to do so with regard to the Mongol affair. *Catherwood* asserts that from the *Sunni* perspective, the *mufti's* actions in this realm of '*ijtihad* could be deemed illegal.⁸³

Sivan argued that since the *shahadatayn* (double testimony of faith) should suffice for one to be Muslim according to the *Sharia*, bringing in new criteria for belief (such as the adherence to the *Sharia* itself) is problematic, especially as the *mufti* did not clarify "how many nonapplied injunctions bring the ruler (or the individual believer) to the point of no return" in apostasy.⁸⁴ *Maher* also raises doubts: "How is an errant Muslim ruler to be judged, exactly? Is he a *kafir* [infidel], *zalim* [tyrant], or *fasiq* [wicked]?"⁸⁵, and what would these entail respectively?

Though the context of the Mongol invasion and his revulsion against tyrannicide in my opinion provides a more subtle understanding for *Ibn Taymiyya*, nevertheless it is arguable that his broad composition compelled *Rashid Rida* in the early 20th century and his *Salafist* followers to make the *mufti* a modern icon for *jihad* against perceived unbelievers (apostates) whom they probably evaluated differently than the medieval scholar would have. But that we will never know. This paper does not vie to settle this issue whether *Ibn Taymiyya* practiced '*ijtihad* in this sense. Likewise, we shall never know, how *Ibn Taymiyya* would have related to Mamluk rule had it not been the times of emergency, when the unity of *Dar al-Islam* was far more important to him than correcting the faults within.

What we do know is that *Salafi* and *Islamist* scholars did and still do not care about the historical context in which *Ibn Taymiyya* declared a *jihad* against a foreign threat, but adhered to a Mamluk Sultan who was very much wanting too when it came to perfect compliance with the *Sharia*. These modern radicals seem to be in ignorance of the fact that while *Ibn Taymiyya*

77 JANSEN, The dual nature of Islamic fundamentalism 32–33.

78 JANSEN, The dual nature of Islamic fundamentalism 35.

79 JANSEN, The dual nature of Islamic fundamentalism 38.

80 JANSEN, The dual nature of Islamic fundamentalism 38–40.

81 BENJAMIN – SIMON, The Age of Sacred Terror, chapter 2 (iBook).

82 CATHERWOOD, A Brief History of the Middle East 115.

83 CATHERWOOD, A Brief History of the Middle East 115.

84 SIVAN, Radical Islam 97.

85 MAHER, Salafi-Jihadism 91.

most definitely called for holy war against the withholders of *Sharia*, this did not entail an appeal for the removal of erroneous Muslim leadership as the power-vacuum could cause the downfall of *Dar al-Islam* in tumultuous times such as the medieval scholar had to endure. Then again, it seems he was a controversial figure not only in modern times but for his own contemporaries, since he was constantly ostracized and persecuted by the elite and even spent many years and eventually died in prison.⁸⁶

3. Conclusion

No matter the nuances we established regarding *Ibn Taymiyya*'s legal assessment of the Mongol leadership, fundamentalists of the modern era were largely in line with the *mufti* when it comes to the holy war against infidels. One thing that seems common between the classic form of fundamentalism and the modern form of Islamism, is the universal doctrine of *jihad*. That is why *Ibn Taymiyya* remains ever so polarizing. He wrote: "Indeed, those who disbelieve in Allah and His messengers and wish to discriminate between Allah and His messengers and say, 'We believe in some and disbelieve in others,' and wish to adopt a way in between – they are the disbelievers, truly, and We have prepared for the disbelievers a humiliating punishment" (*Qur'an: Nisā' 4:150–151*). *The Jews and Christians are included in this, as are the philosophers who believe in some and disbelieve in some.*⁸⁷

This leaves hardly any ground for interpretation: he speaks about the very obvious meaning of *jihad*, which is the armed struggle against the infidels, whose end according to the very core of Islamic teaching shall be some form of grave mortification, depending on how they relate to the subjugation. For this teaching alone, the *mufti* will remain a role model for *Islamists* whose aim is global *jihad*.

However, we found that *Ibn Taymiyya*, in his troubled historical context, did not aim for an internal revolt against a Muslim ruler in his *fatwa* against the Mongol Ilkhans. Rather, he deemed them as a foreign threat, as infidels for their syncretism and deviation from *Sharia* (even after their supposed conversion to Islam), therefore we argued that this is not to be translated as a call for a revolt against corrupt Muslim rulers, but a call for *jihad* against infidels or unbelievers (simple *kafir* or 'worse', apostates, the interpretations vary, as *Ibn Taymiyya* seems not preoccupied with the delineation). Even if the *mufti* waged (spiritual and/or physical) war on either infidels or apostates, he did not extend this message to Muslim leaders who did not abide with *Sharia*. Rather, he preferred firm authority, let it be corrupt, it is still preferable to no leadership at all, and he severely spoke against rebellion. Nevertheless, even if the *takfir* of certain figures by *Ibn Taymiyya* is not a sufficient basis for rebellions within the Islamic world, it (together with his stance on *jihad* itself) is more than an adequate point of reference for war against 'infidels'.

The controversy surrounding the jurist is clearly shown for example by the 2010 Mardin conference for 'reclaiming' *Ibn Taymiyya*. Prominent scholars such as shaykh *Abdallah bin Bayyah* and shaykh *Habib 'Ali al-Jifri* wished to cut the ties of radicalism to the medieval jurist. *Maher* however notes somewhat bitterly that "revisionist efforts have failed to disabuse militants of their misunderstanding"⁸⁸ of *Ibn Taymiyya*, which is reflected in e.g. the dismissal of the conference by *Anwar al-Awlaki* (a radical American Islamic scholar) as "an attempt at justifying the new world

86 AL-QARADAWI, *Priorities of The Islamic Movement in The Coming Phase* 60.

87 ISLAM – ERYİÇİT, *Islam and the State in Ibn Taymiyya* 157.

88 MAHER, *Salafi-Jihadism* 86.

order,” and that it is obligatory to rebel against a leader who has left the faith.⁸⁹ What remains as fact on the ground is that *Rashid Rida*, *Sayyid Qutb* and many others used *Ibn Taymiyya*’s law and theology on war to create a “coherent ideology which has shown itself able to inspire many people to face their own death calmly for the sake of Islam, and to kill in its name.”⁹⁰ In the modern setting, his self-proclaimed followers interpreted his thoughts to combat the ‘threats of Westernization’ from within the Muslim world.

Several events could be cited from the past decades that give urgency to the discussion of this topic. The terror attacks of the recent years (especially the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel in 2023 which is one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in history) make this issue all the more sensitive for the contemporary academic, and highlights the significance and urgency to research *Ibn Taymiyya* and other fundamentalist thinkers in detail and in context. Therefore, further research would be worthy to focus on the ideological roots that have contributed to such incidents ever since *Ibn Taymiyya*, for these fundamentalists were the ones who filled the space between *Ibn Taymiyya*’s lines and created a new ideology that partially resembles its predecessor. At the end of the day, however, it was the *mufti* who utilized a language that was vague enough for such interpretation by modern fundamentalists, though whether the medieval jurist phrased so intentionally or unintentionally, we might never know. What is widely known is that the radical interpretation of the *mufti* became a reality for so many people in the East and the West alike. It is the task of researchers to untangle the threads of legal interpretation and ideology in this vast ball of twine so that we can see clearer.

Sources and literature

- AL-AZAMI, Usaama: ‘Abdullāh Bin Bayyah and the Arab Revolutions: Counter-Revolutionary Neo-Traditionalism’s Ideological Struggle against Islamism. *Muslim World* 109:3, 2019, 343–361,
- AL-QARADAWI, Yusuf: *Islamic Awakening Between Rejection and Extremism*. London 2006
- AL-QARADAWI, Yusuf: *Priorities of The Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase*. Cairo 1992
- ALMOND, Gabriel A. – APPLEBY, R. Scott – SIVAN, Emmanuel: *Strong Religion – The Rise of Fundamentalisms around the World*. Chicago 2003
- BENJAMIN, Daniel – SIMON, Steven: *The Age of Sacred Terror – Radical Islam’s War Against America*. New York 2002 (iBook edition)
- CATHERWOOD, Christopher: *A Brief History of the Middle East – From Abraham to Arafat*. New York 2006
- EUBEN, Roxanne L. – ZAMAN, Muhammad Qasim: *Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought – Texts and Contexts from al-Banna to Bin Laden*. Princeton NJ 2010
- FARAJ, Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salam (as ‘Abdus Salam Faraj): *The Absent Obligation*. Birmingham 2000
- GERGES, Fawaz A.: *ISIS: A history*. Princeton NJ 2017
- HOOVER, Jon: *Makers of the Muslim World – Ibn Taymiyya*. London 2019
- HUMPHREYS, R. Stephen: *Islamic History: A Framework for Inquiry – Rev. Ed.* Princeton NJ 2020
- IBN TAYMIYYA – FARRUK, Omar A. (trans.): *Siyāsah al-shar‘īyah fi islāh al-rā‘ī wa-al-ra‘īyah (Ibn Taymiyya on Public Law and Private Law in Islam or Public Policy in Islamic Jurisprudence)*. Beirut 1966

89 MAHER, Salafi-Jihadism 86.

90 JANSEN, The dual nature of Islamic fundamentalism 48.

- ISLAM, Jaan S. – ERYIĞIT, Adem: *Islam and the State in Ibn Taymiyya – Translation and Analysis*. New York 2022
- JANSEN, Johannes J. G.: Faraj, Muhammad ‘Abd al- Salam (1954-82). In: BOWERING, Gerhard (ed.): *Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought*. Princeton NJ 2013
- JANSEN, Johannes: *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism*. Ithaca NY 1997
- LAOUST, Henri: *La profession de foi d’Ibn Taymiyya*. Paris 1986
- LAOUST, Henri: *Le Traité de droit public d’Ibn Taimiyya (édition et traduction)*. Damascus 1952
- LEWIS, Bernard: *The Political Language of Islam*. London 1988
- MAHER, Shiraz: *Salafi-Jihadism – The History of An Idea*. Oxford 2016
- MICHOT, Yahya M.: Ibn Taymiyya. In: BOWERING, Gerhard (ed.): *Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought*. Princeton NJ 2013
- RAPOPORT, Yossef – AHMED, Shahab: *Ibn Taymiyya and His Times*. Karachi 2010
- SHEIKH, Naveed S.: *Making Sense of Salafism – Theological Foundations, Ideological Iterations, and Political Manifestations*. In: HAYNES, Jeffrey (ed.): *The Routledge Handbook on Religion, Politics and Ideology*. New York 2022
- SIMON Róbert: *Az iszlám fundamentalizmus – Gyökerek és elágazások Mohamedtől az al-Qá’idáig [Islamic Fundamentalism – Roots and Ramifications from Muhammad to al-Qa’ida]*. Budapest 2014
- SIVAN, Emmanuel: *Radical Islam – Medieval Theology and Modern Politics*. New Haven CT 1985
- ZAMAN, Muhammad Qasim: *Modern Islamic Thought in a Radical Age – Religious Authority and Internal Criticism*. New York 2012

